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The
Relativity of Biblical Ethics
by Joe Edward Barnhard
from Biblical v. Secular Ethics: The Conflict
edited by R Joseph Hoffman and Gerald A Larue
Buffalo, New York (1988), Prometheus
Books
It is an axiom among fundamentalists
and evangelicals that theology is the foundation of ethics and morality
in North America culture. Without this foundation, they fear, ethics
would fragment into total relativism or dissolve into whim, arbitrariness,
and chaos. I would like to contest that view by showing how some organized
religions are parasitical to the body of ethics and how the Bible itself
exemplifies moral relativism.
Various theologians of the middle Ages raised the
interesting questions of whether right and wrong are whatever God decrees
them to be. For example, if God commanded "Thou shalt rape thrice
daily," would it have been morally right to carry out the command
and wrong to disobey it? If divine decree is not only the source but the
ultimate criterion of right and wrong, is there any basis for trusting
the Supreme Being who concocts the meaning of right and wrong? Indeed,
were this putative Being to trick his creatures by scrambling the consequences
of commands and prohibitions, it would be irrational to call Him evil;
He is the Cosmic Existentialist who invents right and wrong ex nihilo.
If he should lie, deceive, order Joshua to slaughter the Canaanites, or
command rape, He could do all this and still label Himself as perfectly
good.
Apparently having second thoughts about a Supreme Being
unrestrained by moral principles, in the year of his death C. S. Lewis
wrote: "The real danger is of coming to believe such dreadful things
about Him. The conclusion I dread is not 'so there's no God after all,'
but 'So this is what God is really like. Deceive yourself no longer.'"[1]
Only four months before his death, Lewis wrote in a letter to an American
philosopher that there were dangers in judging God by moral standards.
However, he maintained that "believing in a God whom we cannot but
regard as evil, and then, in mere terrified flattery calling Him 'good'
and worshipping Him, is still greater danger."[2]
Lewis was responding specifically to the question of
Joshua's slaughter of the Canaanites by divine decree and Peter's striking
Ananias and Sapphira dead. Knowing that the evangelical doctrine of the
Bible's infallibility required him to approve of "the atrocities
(and treacheries) of Joshua," Lewis made this surprising concession:
"The ultimate question is whether the doctrine of the goodness of
God or that of the inerrancy of Scriptures is to prevail when they conflict.
I think the doctrine of the goodness of God is the more certain of the
two indeed, only that doctrine renders this worship of Him obligatory
or even permissible.[3]
In short, Lewis came close to saying that the Supreme Might must live
up to moral standards if he is to be regarded as God and not as some cosmic
sadist unworthy of worship.
In his letter to the philosopher, Lewis expresses the realization that
he could not wholly relativize and trivialize the concept of goodness
for the Supreme Being he envisioned:
To this some will reply "ah,
but we are fallen and don't recognize good when we see it." But
God Himself does not say that we are as fallen at all that. He constantly,
in Scripture, appeals to our conscience: "Why do ye not of yourselves
judge what is right?" -- "What fault hath my people found
in me?" And so on. Socrates' answer to Euthyphro is used in Christian
form by Hooker. Things are not good because God commands them; God commands
certain things because he sees them to be good. (In other words, the
Divine Will is the obedient servant to the Divine Reason.) The opposite
view (Ockham's, Paley's) leads to an absurdity. If "good"
means "what God wills" then to say "God is good"
can mean only "God wills what he wills." Which is equally
true of you or me or Judas or Satan.[4]
Lewis was not always consistent in his attempt
to find a foundation for morality. In some of his earlier books he suggests
that God's goodness is incompatible with whatever happens, which, instead
of giving theism any advantage over atheism, does little more than make
Cosmic Might the personification of moral randomness, of relativism gone
out of control.
Recently, I asked a fundamentalist author and apologist who had labeled
abortion as murder to tell me whether the killing of pregnant Canaanite
women by putative divine decree and Joshua's sword was murder. He replied
that the unborn babies killed by Joshua went straight to heaven -- which
of course does not answer the question of whether God committed murder
or whether God is above (or below) moral standards. The point here is
not to determine whether the fetus is a person but to call attention to
the fact that there is considerable moral and ethical relativism in theology
and the Bible. Consider this passage from Deuteronomy:
He whose testicles are crushed or whose male
member is cut off shall not enter the assembly of the Lord.
No bastard shall enter the assembly of the Lord; even to the tenth generation
none of his descendants shall enter the assembly of the Lord.
No Ammorite or Moabite shall enter the assembly of the Lord; even to
the tenth generation none belonging to them shall enter the assembly
of the Lord for ever. [Deut. 23:1-3 (RSV)]
Whatever the circumstances prompting
these prohibitions, it is noteworthy that fundamentalist and evangelical
apologists find it necessary to call upon their own version of situation
ethics in order to make it clear that not all moral injunctions in the
Scriptures are moral absolutes. Evangelical scholar G. T. Manley, in The
New Bible Commentary, tries to justify the morally inferior outlook
found in Deuteronomy by noting that it belongs to "the Mosaic age,
and [is] quite different from that of the later monarchy."[5]
Unfortunately, to cast the biblical material in historical context (as
doubtless it should be) serves only to emphasize the historical relativism
of so-called biblical morality. Indeed, the very notion of a complete
and self-consistent biblical morality is problematic. The attempt
by some evangelicals to borrow the "progressive revelation"
principle in order to make the claim that the later revelation (i.e.,
the New Testament) stands on a higher plane than the earlier revelation
(the Old Testament) collapses when one considers the rage against, and
hatred of, most of the human race exemplified in the Book of Revelation.
And certainly the threat found in Hebrews 6:4-6 -- which proclaims that
God will never forgive a repentant apostate -- is more, not less vicious
than anything found in the Old Testament. When theologians try to justify
the vendetta that the Book of Revelation describes in lurid detail, they
demonstrate just how perverse the human mind can sometimes become.
Those who believe that the Bible presents its readers moral absolutes
have failed to acknowledge the staggering diversity of its moral perspectives.
These differing perspectives are often grounded in the political and evangelical
experiences of the early Christian church. Professor Daniel Fuller, noted
evangelical scholar and former president of Fuller Seminary, pointed out
to me, for example, that the apostle Paul had three major problems to
face in the early Christian churches: (1) the wall separating Jew and
Gentile, (2) the wall separating male and female, and (3) the wall separating
slave from free citizen. According to Fuller, Paul, whose theological
interpretation of Christ's teachings formed the foundation of the Church,
felt that he had to make a practical decision to concentrate on the problem
of the ethnic and religious relationship between Judaism and Christianity
to the exclusion of the other two problems. Fuller's point is that, while
racism and sexism are in principle undermined by the Christian
gospel ("Love thy neighbor as thyself"), Paul was forced to
leave to later generations the application of this subversive Christian
insight to the problems of racism and sexism. For Paul, getting the church
off the ground was the key thing; to try to implement total Christian
justice would have scared most potential converts away. I take this to
be an example of situational ethics. Whether Paul utilized situation ethics
in order to advance the agape principle of 1 Corinthians 13 more
effectively is a question open for debate. As Morton Smith ably demonstrated
in Free Inquiry (Spring 1987) there is much in the Bible that contributed
to the institution of slavery and little that in actual practice moved
against it. Even the Golden Rule of the New Testament, because of its
abstractness and adaptability, has throughout history often failed to
override the deep-seated racial bigotry of the Book of Genesis.
The doctrine of election
accepted by the Puritans did not incline them to gentleness in their
dealing with inferior races. The savage Negroes and the savage Indians
were accursed peoples whom it was quite proper to destroy and enslave.
"We know not when or how these Indians first became the inhabitants
of this mighty continent," says Cotton Mather, "yet we may
guess that probably the devil decoyed these miserable savages hither,
in hope that the gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ would never come to
destroy or disturb this absolute empire over them."[6]
To be sure, the Bible gives conflicting messages
regarding the assimilation of strange peoples. Compare, for example, the
books of Ruth and Ezra. the moving and humanistic story of Ruth in the
Old Testament is viewed by some scholars as a moral challenge to the Deuteronomic
injunction to bar Moabites from the Lord's assembly. The book tells the
story of an Israelite man who, because of famine in Israel, chose to move
to Moab, taking his wife Naomi with him. The man died leaving Naomi with
two sons, one of whom married Ruth, a Moabite. In time, the two Israelite
sons living in Moab died, leaving Naomi with two widowed daughters-in-law.
According to this tightly woven story, when the famine in Israel passed
and Naomi returned to her homeland, Ruth the Moabitess moved with her,
asserting, "Your people shall be my people and your God my God"
(Ruth 1:16 RSV).
The author of the Book of Ruth remarks again and again that Ruth was the
Moabitess; she even calls herself "a foreigner." Despite this
Boaz (of Bethlehem in Judah) takes Ruth for his wife. He marries her in
part because of the goodness she has shown for her mother-in-law,
Naomi. Boaz declares that "all my fellow townsmen know that you are
a woman of worth" (3:11 RSV).
The story closes with a telling blow against racial bigotry: Ruth has
a son, Obed, who in time becomes the grandfather of none other than David
himself. So, the Moabitess is the great-grandmother of Israel's most beloved
king.
The moral conclusion of the Book of Ezra is less savory. According to
Ezra 9 and 10 the Israelite exiles returning from captivity had brought
a curse on themselves. God had sent a heavy rain to the land as punishment
for their sin of marrying foreign women and bringing them back to pollute
the land of Israel. Ezra's solution was simple. Those Israelite men who
had foreign (even Moabite) wives should demonstrate their faithfulness
to God by putting all these wives away. If the story of Ezra 10 reflects
an actual historical period, then we must believe that there was wholesale
divorce in the land of Israel during Ezra's time. Indeed, Ezra destroyed
more than marriages. Upon his command, and in the name of God, the men
who had married foreign women were forced to separate themselves from
their children as well.
It is interesting to see how this kind of moral relativism
is perpetuated by evangelical commentaries. in The New Bible Commentary,
evangelical scholar J. Stafford Wright claims that Ezra's morality should
be accorded the status of a norm, the biblical story of Ruth merely an
exception to the rule.[7] This strange
piece of gerrymandering becomes even more strange when set against the
background of the apostle Paul's instruction, which is the opposite of
Ezra's. Paul advises the Christian woman who is married to an unbeliever
to remain with him as long as he consents to the marriage. Paul then says
that the children will greatly benefit by the marriage being kept intact.
Ezra's justification for commanding divorce is that the mixed marriage
is a pollution or defilement. Paul's justification for advising against
divorce is twofold: to provide the Christian with opportunities in marriage
to spiritually redeem her or his spouse, and to prevent the children from
becoming "unclean" (1 Cor. 7:20).
Those who think that the Bible is above situation ethics might find the
following worth pondering. In 1 Corinthians 7:20-31, Paul appears to believe
that the end of the world is around the corner. In the context of that
conviction, the following advice is given: "Every one should remain
in the state in which he was called" (1 Cor. 7:20 RSV). Paul elaborates:
I think that in view of the present distress
it is well for a person to remain as he is. Are you bound to a wife?
Do not seek to be free. Are you free from a wife? Do not seek marriage.
But if you marry, you do not sin.... Yet those who marry will have worldly
troubles, and I would spare you that. I mean, brethren, the appointed
time has grown very short; from now on, let those who have wives live
as though they had none, and those who mourn as though they were not
mourning, and those who rejoice as though they were not rejoicing, and
those who buy as though they had no goods, and those who deal with the
world as though they had no dealings with it. For the form of this world
is passing away. [1 Cor. 7:26-31]
It turned out that Paul's judgement of the historical
situation was in error. The end was not around the corner, and his miscalculation
made his situational advice less than useful. Human miscalculation is
one of the weaknesses of situation ethics; but it is a weakness inherent
in finite human nature -- and it is finite human nature that pervades
biblical thought.
My criticism, however, is not of situation ethics. Rather, I criticize
those theologians who tell people that biblical ethics advances moral
absolutes. In fact, so-called biblical ethics is situation ethics
that often sets itself up as immutable divine decree. The unfortunate
consequence of this tactic is that moral positions taken in te bible are
denied the useful process of criticism and refinement, a process that
is essential if ethics is to escape the brutalizing effects of dogmatism.
NOTES:
1. C.S. Lewis, A grief Observed (New York:
Seabury Press, 1963), pp 9-10.
2. July 3, 1963, letter from C.S. Lewis to John
Beversluis. Letter quoted in full in John Beversluis, C.S. Lewis
and the Search for Rational Religion (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1985), pp. 156 f.
3. Ibid., p. 157. Emphsis added.
4. Cited in ibid., p 157.
5. G.T. Manley, in The New Bible Commentary,
2d ed., F Davidson, ed.(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1954), p. 215.
6. Thomas J. Wertenbaker, The First Americans,
1607-1690 (Chicago: Quadrangle books, 1971), pp 231 f.
7. J. Stafford Wright, in The New Bible Commentary,
op. cit., p. 371.
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